Genesis of accountability and its impact on accounting by Omodero, Cordelia Onyinyechi
International Journal of Financial, Accounting, and Management (IJFAM)  
ISSN: 2656-3355, Vol 1, No 1, 2019, pp 47-55  https://doi.org/10.35912/ijfam.v1i1.78 
  
GENESIS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON ACCOUNTING 
 
Cordelia Onyinyechi Omodero1 
Clifford University Owerrinta, Abia State, Nigeria1 
 
Corresponding author email: cordeliaomodero@yahoo.com 
ORCID: 0000-0002-8758-9756 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article History 
Received on 15 October 2019 
1st Revision on 15 October 2019 
2nd Revision on 16 October 2019 
Accepted on 22 October 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: This study examines the genesis of accountability: a 
global view. The concept of accountability has been viewed from 
various disciplinary lenses in order to develop an integrated 
understanding of the term. Special attention is devoted to 
principal—agent perspectives from political science and 
economics. 
 
Design/Research method: An integrated framework is developed, 
based on four central observations. (1) Accountability is relational 
in nature and is constructed through inter- and intra-organizational 
relationships. (2) Accountability is complicated by the dual role of 
nonprofits as both principals and agents in their relationships with 
other actors. (3) Characteristics of accountability necessarily vary 
with the type of nonprofit organization being examined. (4) 
Accountability operates through external as well as internal 
processes, such that an emphasis on external oversight and control 
misses other dimensions of accountability essential to nonprofit 
organizations. 
 
Finding: The study finds that the time has come for individuals, 
organizations, stakeholders, establishments, institutions and 
governments to focus on reporting on their programme results, 
such as inventory take result and product performance result. 
 
Limitation: Paucity of data and empirical works were the major 
restrictions to this study.  
 
Implication: Thus, being clear about intentions, measuring and 
understanding results, and making adjustments where necessary, 
would help assure taxpayers/stakeholders that their money is being 
spent wisely. A focus on results would also help to ensure that 
limited public resources are being applied in a way that provides 
the most value to all concerned. 
 
Keywords: Accountability, Genesis, Performance, Responsibility, 
Types, Assessment, Global 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accountability is an often-used word, yet the concept of accountability is not easily understood. When 
people hear the word accountability, they know that it means something important, but that’s about as 
far as it goes. Subsequently, because they don’t grasp the concept of accountability, they don’t know 
how to (and can’t) achieve it. Often, the word responsibility is used in conjunction with the word 
accountability. When hearing the word accountability, many people immediately equate it with 
responsibility and see the two as being the same.  However, (in our opinion) they are not. For example, 
one quoted author points out the difference, noting that, responsibility is the obligation to perform. 
This helps employee to understand the objectives of organization which are vital in determining 
whether or not the organization will succeed (Yuliansyah, 2016). Accountability is the liability one 
assumes for ensuring that an obligation to perform—a responsibility—is fulfilled” (Frost, 1998). 
Another key word used when discussing accountability is authority. Distinguishing the difference 
between it and responsibility is important to understanding the concept of accountability. Authority is 
the right to act without prior approval from higher management and without challenge from 
managing peers (Frost, 1998). Authority is assigned. On the other hand, responsibility is delegated. In 
all of the available literature on the subject of accountability, no common definition or view of 
accountability can be found. This lack of commonality is due partly to the fact that the concept of 
accountability—especially in the governmental setting—is just coming to the forefront.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the genesis of accountability in global perspectives. 
Accordingly, the following specific objectives have been pursued in this paper:  
(a) To explore the genesis and concept of accountability 
(b) To examine the types of accountability under discussion  
(c) To assess accountability relations, arrangements and systems 
In order to achieve the above objectives the following research questions have been raised for 
discussions in this study:  
 (i) What is genesis and concept of accountability?  
 (ii) What are types of accountability being discussed?  
 (iii) How should we assess accountability relations, arrangements and systems? 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 The Genesis and Concept of Accountability 
The word ‘accountability’ is Anglo-Norman, not Anglo-Saxon, in origin. Historically and 
semantically, it is closely related to accounting, in its literal sense of bookkeeping. According to 
Dubnick (2002), the roots of the contemporary concept can be traced to the reign of William I, in 
the decades after the 1066 Norman conquest of England. In 1085 William required all the property 
holders in his realm to render account of what they possessed. These possessions were assessed and 
listed by royal agents in the so-called Domesday Books. This census was not held for taxation 
purposes alone; it also served as a means to establish the foundations of royal governance. The 
Domesday Books listed what was in the king’s realm; moreover, the landowners were all required 
to swear oaths of fealty to the crown. By the early twelfth century, this had evolved into a highly 
centralized administrative kingship that was ruled through centralized auditing and semi-annual 
account-giving.  In the centuries since the reign of William I of England, accountability has slowly 
wrestled free from its etymological bondage with accounting. In contemporary political discourse, 
‘accountability’ and ‘accountable’ no longer convey a stuffy image of bookkeeping and financial 
administration, but they hold strong promises of fair and equitable governance. Moreover, the 
accounting relationship has almost completely reversed. ‘Accountability’ does not refer to 
sovereigns holding their subjects to account, but to the reverse, it is the authorities themselves who 
are being held accountable by their citizens.  
Accountability stems from Late Latin accomptare (to account), a prefixed form 
of computare (to calculate), which in turn derived from putare (to reckon), (Ezzamel, 1997). While 
the word itself does not appear in English until its use in 13th century Norman England, (Seidman, 
2005). The concept of account-giving has ancient roots in record keeping activities related to 
governance and money-lending systems that first developed in 
Ancient Egypt, Israel, Babylon, Greece, and later, Rome, (Walzer, 1994; Urch, 1929; Roberts, 
1982;  Plescia, 2001; Scott & Lyman, 1968). Accountability involves either the expectation or 
assumption of account-giving behaviour. The study of account giving as a sociological act was 
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articulated in a 1968 article on "Accounts" by Marvin Scott and Stanford Lyman, (Scott & Lyman, 
1968). Also, it can be traced as well to  Austin's (1956) essay “A Plea for Excuses”, in which he 
used excuse-making as an example of speech acts. 
Communications scholars have extended this work through the examination of strategic uses 
of excuses, justifications, rationalizations, apologies and other forms of account giving behaviour 
by individuals and corporations, and Plescia, (2001) has applied experimental design techniques to 
explore how individuals behave under various scenarios and situations that demand accountability. 
Since the late twentieth century, the Anglo-Saxon world in particular has witnessed a 
transformation of the traditional bookkeeping function in public administration into a much broader 
form of public accountability (Harlow, 2002). This broad shift from financial accounting to public 
accountability ran parallel to the introduction of New Public Management by the Thatcher-
government in the United Kingdom and to the Reinventing Government reforms initiated by the 
Clinton-Gore administration in the United States. Both reforms introduced a range of private sector 
management styles and instruments into the public sector (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2005), including 
contract management both within and outside the public sector, the use of performance indicators 
and benchmarks to evaluate and compare the effectiveness and efficiency of public agencies, to 
name but a few. Most of these instruments require extensive auditing to be effective.  
This shift from financial accounting to performance auditing and public accountability can 
also be observed on the European continent, although the speed and scope differs. Countries with a 
strong tradition of administrative law and a strong Rechtsstaat, such as France, Germany and Italy, 
have, on average, been less vigorous in adopting these more managerially oriented styles of 
governance. Countries like the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland are intermediate cases (Pollitt & 
Summer, 1997; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2005).  The emancipation of ‘accountability’ from its 
bookkeeping origins is therefore originally an Anglo-American phenomenon – if only because 
other languages, such as French, Portuguese, Spanish, German, Dutch, or Japanese, have no exact 
equivalent and do not (yet) distinguish semantically between ‘responsibility’ and ‘accountability’ 
(Mulgan, 2000; Harlow, 2002; Dubnick, 2002). Accountability is a multidimensional concept and 
often a key enabler of success . . . To truly work, accountability has to be shared by managers and 
employees; further, your organization as a whole must be accountable to the customer and stakeholder 
(Dubnick & Barbara, 1993; Dubnick, 1998).  
Accountability is an often used word, yet the concept of accountability is not easily understood. 
When people hear the word  accountability, they know that it means something important, but 
that’s about as far as it goes. Subsequently, because they don’t grasp the concept of accountability, 
they don’t know how to (and can’t) achieve it. This section provides several views on accountability, 
gives a working definition of accountability, presents its key aspects, and identifies the levels of 
accountability. By the time you finish reading this section, you should have a better understanding 
of the concept of accountability. Accountability is one of those golden concepts that no one can be 
against. It is increasingly used in political discourse and policy documents because it conveys an 
image of transparency and trustworthiness. However, its evocative powers make it also a very 
elusive concept because it can mean many different things to different people, as anyone studying 
accountability will soon discover. This paper nevertheless tries to develop an analytical framework 
for the empirical study of accountability arrangements in the public domain. It starts from a narrow, 
relational definition of accountability and distinguishes a number of indicators that can be used to 
identify and classify accountability arrangements. Furthermore, it develops three perspectives to 
assess and evaluate accountability arrangements in the public domain. In all of the available 
literature on the subject of accountability, no common definition or view of accountability can be 
found. This lack of commonality is due partly to the fact that the concept of accountability—
especially in the governmental setting—is just coming to the forefront. Accountability may be 
defined as a clearly recognized employee responsibility for the (official) manner of an identified 
program assignment where performance is assessed through the use of well-known standards. 
 
2.2 Types of Accountability under discussion 
Accountability comes in many guises. Public institutions are frequently required to account for 
their conduct to various forums in a variety of ways. Political accountability: elected 
representatives, political parties, voters, media Political accountability is an extremely important 
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type of public accountability within democracies. Here, accountability is exercised along the chain 
of principal-agent relationships (Strom, 2000). Voters delegate their sovereignty to popular 
representatives, who in turn, at least in parliamentary democracies, delegate the majority of their 
authorities to a cabinet of ministers. The ministers subsequently delegate many of their authorities 
to their civil servants or to various, more or less independent, administrative bodies. The 
mechanism of political accountability operates precisely in the opposite direction to that of 
delegation. In parliamentary systems with ministerial accountability, such as the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Germany, public servants and their organisations are accountable to their 
minister, who must render political account to parliament (Scott, 2000; Flinders, 2001; Strom, 
Müller & Bergman, 2003).  
Legal accountability: courts  In most western countries, legal accountability is of increasing 
importance to public institutions as a result of  the growing formalisation of social relations 
(Friedman, 1985; Behn, 2001; Dubnick, 2003), or because of the greater trust which is placed in 
courts than in parliaments (Harlow, 2002). These can be the ‘ordinary’ civil courts, as in Britain, or 
also specialised administrative courts, as in France, Belgium, and The Netherlands (Harlow, 2002). 
In some spectacular cases of administrative deviance, such as the affaire du sang (the HIV 
contaminated blood products) in France or the Tangentopoli prosecutions in Italy, public officials 
have even been summoned before penal courts.  
Administrative: auditors, inspectors, and controllers Next to the courts, a wide range of quasi-
legal forums exercising independent and external administrative and financial supervision and 
control, has been established in the past decades - some even speak of an ‘audit explosion’ (Power 
1994). These new administrative forums vary from European, national, or local ombudsmen and 
audit offices, to independent supervisory authorities, inspector generals, anti-fraud offices, and 
chartered accountants. Professional accountability: professional peers.  Many public managers are, 
apart from being general managers, professionals in a more technical sense. They have been trained 
as engineers, doctors, veterinarians, teachers, or police officers (Abbot, 1988; Freidson, 2001). This 
may imply accountability relationships with professional associations and disciplinary tribunals.  
Social accountability: interest groups, charities and other stakeholders In reaction to a 
perceived lack of trust in government, there is an urge in many western democracies for more 
direct and explicit accountability relations between public agencies on the one hand and clients, 
citizens and civil society on the other hand (McCandless, 2001). Influenced by the debate on 
corporate social responsibility and corporate governance in business, more attention has been being 
paid to the role of NGOs, interest groups and customers or clients as relevant ‘stakeholders’ not 
only in determining policy, but also in rendering account (European Commission, 2001; Algemene 
Rekenkamer, 2004). Corporate accountability: the organisation as actor.  Many public 
organisations are corporate bodies with an independent legal status. They can operate as unitary 
actors and can be held accountable accordingly. Most western countries accept corporate liabilities 
in civil, administrative, and even criminal law. Public organisations are usually included in these 
corporate liabilities, with the exception of criminal liability. Most European countries acknowledge 
penal immunities for all public bodies. Some, such as the UK, France, and The Netherlands, accept 
criminal liabilities for local public bodies, but not for the organs of the state. Only Norway, 
Denmark, and Ireland accept criminal liability of both central and local government (Roef, 2001). 
Legal and administrative forums often follow this corporate accountability strategy.  
 Hierarchical accountability: One for all This is the official venue for public accountability in 
most public organisations, and with regard to most types of accountability relationships, with the 
exception of professional accountability. It is particularly dominant in political accountability 
relations, for example in the Westminster system of ministerial responsibility. Underlying 
hierarchical strategies of accountability is a pyramidal image of complex organisations. Processes of 
calling to account start at the top.  Collective accountability: All for one Public organisations are 
collectives of individual officials. Theoretically, a forum could therefore also apply a collective 
strategy of accountability and pick any member of the organisation and hold it personally accountable 
for the conduct of the organisation as a whole, by virtue of the fact that it is a member of the 
organisation. This makes quick work of the practical sides of the problem of many hands. In the case 
of organisational misconduct, every member of the organisation can be held accountable.  
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Individual accountability: Each for himself.  During the judgement phase, which can involve 
the imposition of sanctions, hierarchical and collective accountability strategies often run up 
against moral objections, as a proportional relation between crime and punishment is by no means 
always evident. An individual accountability in which each individual official is held 
proportionately liable for his personal contribution to the infamous conduct of the organisation, is 
from a moral standpoint a far more adequate strategy. Under this approach, each individual is 
judged on the basis of his actual contribution instead of on the basis of his formal position.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
Assessing   Accountability Relations, Arrangements and Systems 
An altogether different exercise is the assessment of the adequacy of a particular accountability 
arrangement or of a complete accountability regime to which a particular agency or sector is 
subject. Here we leave the realm of empirical description and enter the world of evaluation and, 
ultimately, prescription. This is much more a matter of degree and these assessments follow the 
logic of more-or-less (Sartori, 1979). This evaluation can proceed at least two levels. First of all, 
one could undertake a more internal, procedural evaluation of the propriety of a particular 
accountability mechanism or of a specific, concrete accountability process. This could be called 
procedural or internal adequacy. Secondly, one could evaluate accountability arrangement or 
regimes on a more systemic level and focus on the external effects of the accountability processes. 
This could be called systemic or external adequacy. In this case the evaluation is based on the 
functions that accountability arrangements fulfil in political and administrative systems. I will 
discuss both types of assessments. 
The internal evaluative perspective sees at the quality of a particular accountability process 
itself: does the procedure comply with the minimum due requirements of an accountability 
procedure? In a procedure-oriented analysis of this kind, the following questions come to mind: Is 
there (any guarantee for) an adequate and proper provision of information by the actor? Does the 
forum receive timely and sufficient information from the actor in order to enable a well-founded 
judgement of his conduct to be made? Carefully managed embedded press conferences, such as 
those held by the American military during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 may, in the nominal sense, 
represent a form of public accountability. However, the information provided was often scanty in 
the extreme, or biased in favour of the authorities, and there was little room for inquisitive probing 
by journalists, thus disqualifying this as good accountability. 
Next, there is the question of due process during the debate about the actor’s conduct. Is the 
forum prepared to allow the actor sufficient opportunity to explain and to justify his conduct, or 
does it immediately pass judgement? Has it been made clear to the actor what the standards are in 
relation to which his conduct will be judged? An example of public accountability arrangements 
where these requirements were violently trampled upon were the forced public accountability 
procedures in the former communist dictatorships, as described e.g. by Tonkens, (2003), in which 
dissidents were publicly forced to present themselves as class enemies. Even in the democracies of 
the western world, instances of public accountability occur, such as political accountability to the 
media, in which the principle of hearing and being heard is wantonly disregarded. The third 
question that arises is whether the forum is able to pass sound judgement. Is the forum sufficiently 
independent of the actor or is the actor in actual fact the judge in his own case? This can be an 
important factor in the case of self-appointed panels and visitation committees. Yet the opposite 
can also arise, as in the case of a biased forum. Is the forum sufficiently neutral or has it exhibited a 
strong bias toward the actor? Do the facts warrant the judgement? Is the sanction adequate in the 
light of the judgement?  
This series of questions, respectively about the quality of the provision of information by the 
actor, the quality of the procedure, and the quality of the forum’s judgement, afford a framework 
for a normative analysis of accountability procedures. These might offer a basis for the 
development of a coherent system of requirements for appropriate and proper accountability, the 
principles of good accountability. The key question is obviously what the actual effects are of the 
various types of accountability and how to judge these effects. At this level, inadequacies can either 
take the form of accountability deficits: a lack of sufficient accountability arrangements; or of 
accountability excesses: dysfunctional, negative effects of the accumulation of a range of 
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accountability mechanisms. The former inadequacy can be hypothesized for various aspects of 
European governance (Arnull & Wincott, 2002; Harlow, 2002; Fisher, 2004), the latter is 
increasingly reported by executive agencies and public managers (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996; 
Power, 1994; Behn, 2001; Halachmi, 2002; Tonkens 2003). The questions remains however: how 
do we establish whether these different sorts of inadequacies do exist?  
For an institutionalised ideal that is so broadly supported and applied, there are very few 
references to be found in the literature that could lead to such an evaluation being performed, let 
alone any reports on systematic comparative research conducted in this area. Authors such as Behn 
(2001), Halachmi (2002) and Mulgan (2003) offer discussions of the many dilemmas and design 
problems in the structure of accountability arrangements, but the underlying normative questions – 
what is the purpose of public accountability in a constitutional democratic state and what are the 
evaluation principles for accountability arrangements ensuing from this? – tend to be glossed over 
in these contributions. So why is public accountability important? What is the purpose of the 
various different forms distinguished in this paper? In the academic literature and in policy 
publications about public accountability, three answers recur, albeit implicitly, time and again. 
Public accountability is important to provide a democratic means to monitor and control 
government conduct, for preventing the development of concentrations of power, and to enhance 
the learning capacity and effectiveness of public administration (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000). Each 
of these three answers yields a separate theoretical perspective on the rationale behind public 
accountability and a separate perspective for the assessment of accountability relations.  
The three perspectives outlined above offer more systematic frameworks to evaluate the 
effects of accountability arrangements. The question central to the democratic perspective is 
whether the accountability arrangement adds to the possibilities open to voter, parliament or other 
representative bodies to control the executive power. Thus viewed, the main concern is that the 
accountability arrangements yield relevant information about the conduct of the government. The 
major issue in assessing accountability arrangements from this perspective is whether they help to 
overcome agency problems, such as moral hazard (Strom 2003): do these accountability 
arrangements help to provide political principals with sufficient information about the behaviour of 
their agents and do they offer enough incentives to agents to commit themselves to the agenda’s of 
their democratically elected principals? 
From a constitutional perspective, the key question is whether the arrangement contributes to 
the prevention of corruption and the abuse of powers. This standpoint demands that public 
accountability forums be visible, tangible and powerful, in order to be able to withstand both the 
inherent tendency of those in public office to dexterously evade control and the autonomous 
expansion of power of the all-encompassing bureaucracy. The major issue from this perspective is 
whether accountability arrangements offer enough incentives for officials and agencies to refrain 
from abuse of authority. Does the accountability forum have enough inquisitive powers to reveal 
corruption or mismanagement, are the available sanctions strong enough to have preventive 
effects? The cybernetic perspective obviously focuses on the question of whether the arrangement 
enhances the learning capacity and effectiveness of the public administration. This viewpoint will 
judge accountability arrangements and other feedback mechanisms to be successful if they generate 
feedback information and stimulate elite groups to reflect and to debate about the significance of 
this information with others (Tonkens, 2003). The crucial questions from this perspective are 
whether the accountability arrangements offer sufficient feedback, but also the right incentives, to 
officials and agencies to reflect upon their policies and procedures and to improve upon them. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This paper has tried to get to grips with the appealing but elusive concept of accountability by asking 
three types of questions, thus providing three types of building blocks for such an evaluation. First a 
conceptual one: what is genesis and concept of accountability? Accountability is often used in a very 
broad sense, as a synonym for a variety of evaluative, but essentially contested concepts, such as 
responsiveness, responsibility and effectiveness. In this paper the concept of accountability is taken in 
a much more narrow sense: a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgment, and the actor can be sanctioned. This implies that the focus of accountability research 
should be on ex post facto processes in governance and not on ex ante inputs.  
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The second question is an analytical one: what are types of accountability being discussed? On 
the basis of the narrow definition of accountability, a series of dimensions of accountability have been 
discerned, that can be used in the description of the various accountability relations and arrangements 
that can be found in the different domains of European governance. Taken together, these two building 
blocks provide a descriptive framework for more systematic mapping exercises: are the various 
institutions of the European Union subjected to accountability relations at all, and, if so, how can we 
classify these accountability relations?  The third question is an altogether different, evaluative 
question: how should we assess accountability relations, arrangements and systems? Three 
perspectives have been provided for the assessment of accountability relations: a democratic, a 
constitutional, and a cybernetic perspective. Each of these three perspectives may render different 
types of accountability deficits.  
Conclusively, this study offers four broad observations about accountability in global perspective. 
First, accountability is a relational concept. It does not stand objectively apart from organizational 
relationships, since the demands for accountability and the mechanisms used to achieve it are 
constructed by those very relationships. Second, organizations can function as both principals and 
agents in each of these relationships. Moreover, the dominant direction of a relationship is determined 
by the presence and use of accountability mechanisms to enforce it. Third, the characteristics of 
accountability necessarily vary with organization type. Accountability to clients appears to be weak in 
these organizations, at least in comparison to accountability to funders and regulators. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Finally, accountability is both external and internal. It may be defined as the means through which 
individuals and organizations are held externally to account for their actions (for example, through 
legal obligations and explicit reporting and disclosure requirements) and as the means by which they 
take internal responsibility for continuously shaping and scrutinizing organizational mission, goals, 
and performance (such as through self-evaluations, participatory decision processes, and the 
systematic linking of organizational values to conduct). Although external oversight is necessary, no 
amount of it will inculcate a felt responsibility. An integrated perspective recognizes this 
multidimensional and relational nature of accountability, rather than reducing it to a concept enforced 
through oversight and regulatory mechanisms. 
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